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Summary of main findings
• Claimants in higher rent areas (especially London) were more likely to start a new claim 
just before the reforms were introduced in April 2011: these tenants would have more 
to lose in cash terms from the changes in Local Housing Allowance (LHA) rates caused 
by the reforms; these claimants did not, therefore, become subject to the new rules until 
late in 2012.
• The analysis estimates that the LHA reforms reduced maximum LHA entitlements 
for new claimants up to the end of 2011 by an average of £8.21 per week, which 
was comprised of rent reductions of £0.46 per week and increased shortfalls (gaps 
between rent and LHA) of £7.76 per week over this immediate post-reform period: these 
estimates imply that 94 per cent of the initial incidence of reduced LHA entitlements was 
on tenants and six per cent on landlords.
• These results vary by claimant sub-group. Single claimants and younger claimants 
seem to have been able to pass a greater share of the incidence of the reductions on to 
landlords (via reduced rents), which may reflect their greater propensity to move house. 
• The incidence of the reforms on landlords also varied geographically: it was greater in 
urban areas outside London and in London suburbs. 
• A note of caution is needed about the results at this stage of the analysis: they may 
be short-term effects, in that it may take tenants time to negotiate lower rents with 
landlords; it may also take time for tenants to seek cheaper accommodation; and 
landlords may accept informally lower than the contracted rents from LHA tenants.
• The next stage of the analysis will incorporate existing claimants as well and will be  
able to investigate the longer term impacts of the reforms, to establish if this pattern  
of impacts on landlords and tenants is sustained.
63
Monitoring the impact of changes to the Local Housing Allowance system 
of Housing Benefit: Interim report
3.1 Introduction
This report forms part of the first stage of the review of the impact of recent measures 
(introduced from April 2011 onwards) to change the system of LHAs in the private rented 
sector (PRS) in Great Britain. It analyses administrative data on Housing Benefit (HB) claims 
by claimants subject to LHA rules in order to examine the impact of the LHA measures 
introduced in April 2011 on new LHA claimants.32 
This research project was commissioned by the Government in 2011. The evaluation is being 
undertaken by a research consortium from the Centre for Regional Economic and Social 
Research (CRESR) at Sheffield Hallam University, the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), the 
Blatvatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford and Ipsos MORI. The overall 
research programme involves both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative 
methods comprise spatial analysis and econometric analysis based on nationwide data 
on HB claimants, and surveys of claimants and landlords in 19 case study areas across 
Britain33. The qualitative methods comprise interviews with claimants, landlords and housing 
advisers in the case study areas. This broad-based approach to the research is designed to 
monitor some of the impacts of the LHA measures in the short to medium term, while being 
sensitive to different local housing market contexts, and to assess the extent to which LHA 
reforms are starting to induce attitudinal and behavioural changes among landlords and 
tenants in the PRS.
The research programme runs from April 2011 until December 2013. The first report from  
the research team examined the findings of the wave 1 large-scale face-to-face surveys  
of claimants and a postal survey of landlords in the 19 case study areas (DWP, 2012).  
These surveys were undertaken in autumn 2011: several months after most of the measures 
had been introduced for new LHA claimants, but before they had an impact on the rents and 
housing circumstances of existing (pre-April 2011) LHA claimants. (For further details of the 
overall research programme see DWP, 2012.) 
The main outcomes of interest in this section are LHA entitlements, contractual rents,  
the differences between the two, and the types of properties that LHA claimants inhabit.  
We also examine whether the impacts of the LHA reforms differ across sub-groups of 
claimants.
The main reforms considered here are:
• setting LHA rates at the 30th percentile of PRS rents rather than the 50th percentile;
• abolition of the five-bedroom LHA rates;
• capping the LHA rates at £250, £250, £290, £340 and £400 per week for the shared room, 
one-bedroom, two-bedroom, three-bedroom and four-bedroom rates respectively;
32 This section uses the phrase ‘LHA claimants’ as shorthand for ‘Housing Benefit 
claimants subject to the LHA rules’. The phrase ‘new LHA claimants’ covers both those 
individuals who start a claim for the first time, and those who have had a previous claim 
which ceased and subsequently start another claim – these are the individuals who 
were immediately affected by the reforms in question in April 2011.
33 Barking and Dagenham, Blackburn with Darwen, Bradford, Brent, Cardiff, Denbighshire, 
Edinburgh, Exeter, Fenland, Hackney, Newcastle, North Lanarkshire, Perth and 
Kinross, Portsmouth, Rhondda Cynon Taf, Tendring, Thanet, Walsall, Westminster.
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• removal of the £15 per week excess; and
• increase in central government funding for Discretionary Housing Payments (DHPs) by 
£10 million in 2011-12.34 
The section is organised as follows. In 3.2, we discuss what we might expect the key impacts 
of the reforms to have been, with reference to economic theory and previous relevant 
literature. Sub-section 3.3 describes the data and econometric methods used in order to 
obtain our empirical estimates of the impacts of the reforms on new claimants. Sub-section 
3.4 presents and discusses the main results of our analysis for GB as a whole. Sub-section 
3.5 presents sub-group analysis, with estimates of how the impacts of the LHA reforms 
varied by family type, age and area. We conclude with a summary of results and a reminder 
of the main limitations of this work at this interim stage.
3.2 What does economic theory suggest about 
the impact of the LHA measures on LHA 
claimants?
LHA is a rent subsidy, where the maximum cash subsidy depends upon household type and 
Broad Rental Market Area (BRMA). Economic theory suggests that the incidence of rent 
subsidies – in other words, who actually benefits from them –- is in general ambiguous. If 
the rent levels that landlords charge are completely insensitive to rent subsidies, then LHA is 
simply a transfer from taxpayers to tenants. Tenants may ‘spend’ this either by renting more 
expensive accommodation or by purchasing more of other consumption goods, or some 
combination of the two. Alternatively, rents may be higher in the presence of rent subsidies 
than they would otherwise have been: tenants are less sensitive to increases in rents if the 
taxpayer pays at least some of the cost, so landlords may charge higher rents in response. 
In that case, at least some of LHA spending is a transfer from the taxpayer to landlords. 
For the same reasons, reductions to LHA may in general be incident on either landlords  
or tenants (or some combination), and the impact on rent levels is crucial in this regard.  
The LHA reforms considered in this report all act to reduce LHA entitlements for some 
subset of LHA claimants. Consider first the three reforms introduced in April 2011 which 
reduced LHA rates (the maximum rent that can be covered by LHA, given household type 
and BRMA). These were the switch from the 50th to 30th percentile of the non-LHA local 
PRS distribution, the introduction of the national caps for different property types, and the 
abolition of the five-bedroom rate. We would expect these LHA reductions to lead to some 
combination of the following:
• claimants facing a larger shortfall between their rent and the LHA they receive for a given 
type of accommodation (financing more of their rent via non-LHA resources, and hence 
reducing consumption of other goods);
• claimants spending less on rent by moving to cheaper accommodation; or
• claimants spending less on rent for a given type of accommodation due to landlords 
reducing rents.
34 This cost estimate comes from the June 2010 Budget (HM Treasury, 2010). Increases 
in DHP funding of £40 million were announced for 2012–13 onwards.
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The first two items in the above list represent incidence of the LHA reductions on tenants, 
and the third represents incidence on landlords. To the extent that claimants move to 
accommodation where rents or LHA rates are lower than the LHA rate that they would have 
otherwise have been entitled to, the second item also implies further reductions in  
HB spending on the claimants concerned. 
The overall incidence of the LHA reforms on landlords and tenants is, therefore, an empirical 
question. But economic theory provides guidance as to what types of factors will determine 
the answer. We know that the mechanical effect of a reduction in rent subsidies is to 
make a given level of rent more expensive for tenants. Therefore, their demand for rental 
accommodation at a given level of rent is reduced too. This is shown by a downwards shift 
in the demand curve in Figure 3.1, which shows supply and demand in a competitive rental 
market – after the reform, rents need to be lower than before in order for a given quantity of 
accommodation to be demanded, to offset the reduction in rent subsidies. In particular, this 
implies that supply would exceed demand if rents remained at their pre-reform equilibrium 
levels. The new equilibrium rent level, in which supply and demand are equalised once more, 
will, therefore, be lower. But how much lower – and hence, how much of the incidence of the 
reform is ultimately on landlords – depends crucially on the following types of factors:
• How responsive the supply of rented accommodation is to changes in rent levels. 
If the supply of accommodation to LHA recipients is very responsive (‘elastic’) to rents, 
these reforms would not affect the equilibrium rent level much. Conversely, if the supply 
of rented accommodation to the LHA sector was unresponsive (‘inelastic’) to rent levels, 
the new equilibrium rent level would be significantly lower. The intuition is as follows. 
As explained above (and depicted in Figure 3.1), a reduction in rent subsidies reduces 
demand at a given level of rent, and in particular means that supply would exceed demand 
if rents remained at their pre-reform level. Hence, rents in the new equilibrium – that is, 
the rent level at which supply and demand are equal once more – must be lower. If the 
supply of rental accommodation to the LHA sector is very elastic, then rents need to fall 
only a little in order for supply to fall enough that it is aligned once more with demand: in 
other words, the new equilibrium rent level will be only a little lower than the old one. This 
would imply that most of the incidence of the reforms would be on tenants via increased 
shortfalls, rather than landlords via reduced rents. The converse would apply for the case 
of inelastic supply, where rents would need to fall more before supply and demand were 
equalised in a post-reform equilibrium. Figure 3.1 illustrates these points for a competitive 
rental market. In the case where supply is responsive to rent levels, equilibrium rents fall 
by much less (on the left, where they fall from a to b) in response to a reduction in rent 
subsidies than in the case where it is unresponsive (on the right, where they fall from a to 
c). Factors affecting the elasticity of supply for private rental accommodation could include 
things which determine how easy it is to buy up new properties to let, such as planning 
regimes and Stamp Duty Land Tax.
• The share of LHA tenants within a particular rental market, or the level of 
segmentation between the LHA rental market and the wider market. As these reforms 
affect a subset of the private rental market – those claiming HB subject to the LHA 
rules – the demand for rental property in a particular area will fall by less if LHA tenants 
are a small share of the overall market. Where landlords are willing and able to let their 
properties to non-LHA tenants, they will be less likely to reduce their rents in response 
to the LHA reductions. With reference to the competitive market represented by Figures 
3.1 and 3.2, the demand curve that these landlords face for their rental property would 
not shift down as much as it would do if all potential tenants were LHA recipients, and the 
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equilibrium rent level would, therefore, not need to change as much. However, where LHA 
tenants face little competition for properties from non-LHA recipients, landlords would be 
expected to reduce rents to a greater extent. Hence, in a market where given landlords 
would, in principle, let to either LHA or non-LHA claimants, the share of LHA claimants in 
the private rental market should affect the incidence of the reforms. On the other hand, if 
the market is segmented such that given landlords let only to LHA or non-LHA claimants, 
we would not expect this to be important: instead, the crucial factors would be those that 
affect the responsiveness to rent levels of supply and demand for rental accommodation 
specifically in the LHA sector. Evidence presented in Section 5 of these interim research 
outputs, from interviews with landlords, suggests that such segmentation does exist in 
some local private rental markets
• How responsive LHA tenants’ demand is to changes in rent levels. If demand for 
rental property is more sensitive to rent levels, the equilibrium rent level will fall by more 
in response to any reductions in rent subsidies. Intuitively, a reduction in rent subsidies 
means that demand would fall short of supply if landlords continued to charge the 
same rents; but the more elastic demand is, the more it will fall short of supply at the 
old equilibrium rent level, and hence the further rents will have to fall before supply and 
demand are equalised again in the new equilibrium. Figure 3.2 again shows supply and 
demand in a competitive rental market: rents fall by more in the case where demand is 
more responsive to changes in rent levels (on the left, the fall from a to b is much larger 
than the fall from a to c on the right, where responsiveness is lower). Factors affecting 
the demand elasticity could include the costs (financial or otherwise) to LHA claimants of 
moving properties, which might vary with characteristics such as household type and age. 
Figure 3.1 Impact of LHA reductions on rental market depending on responsiveness  
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Figure 3.2 Impact of reforms on rental market depending on responsiveness of  
 demand for rented accommodation to rent levels
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3.2.1 Removal of the £15 per week excess
However, theory suggests that the incidence of the decision to end the £15 per week excess 
that LHA claimants can keep (over and above their rent) is likely to be different from the 
incidence of the other LHA measures. The rationale for the excess, which was a key part of 
the initial introduction of LHA in April 2008, was to encourage claimants to rent a cheaper 
property or negotiate rents downwards, rather than spending their full applicable LHA rate 
on rent. Removing the excess removes this incentive: LHA claimants no longer get any 
financial benefit from spending less than their LHA rate on rent, as they no longer keep any 
of the difference. In choosing between properties where the rent is no higher than the LHA 
rate, claimants, therefore, have little or no reason to choose a cheaper property over a more 
expensive one, and no immediate financial incentive to bargain with landlords to reduce 
rents below the LHA amount35. Similarly, if landlords know that a potential tenant is entitled to 
LHA, they have little or no reason to offer a rent that is less than the LHA rate. On the other 
35 Some tenants may still have an incentive to keep rents lower than their LHA rate if they 
are forward-looking, as they might expect that they may stop claiming LHA in future 
(e.g. because of a move into work or an increase in earnings), and there are costs 
associated with moving house again or renegotiating a rental contract in such an event. 
In that case, they have some incentive to seek lower rents in view of the fact that they 
may face the financial cost of higher rents in future. Nevertheless, these incentives are 
clearly weaker than they would be if tenants also kept £15 per week of the difference 
between the LHA rate and their rent.
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hand, where landlords are unable to identify which potential tenants are LHA recipients or 
are unaware of the relevant details of the LHA system, rents would not be expected to rise  
in response to this reform. This reform in isolation should, therefore, have some combination 
of the following effects:
• landlords increasing rents to or towards the full LHA rate. To the extent that this happens, 
the effect of the reform is to transfer the excess from claimants to landlords rather than 
from claimants to the exchequer;
• tenants choosing more expensive properties, as they would no longer keep any of the 
difference between their LHA rate and their rent. Again, this would not result in any direct 
saving to the exchequer;
• claimants simply losing the excess, with no change in rent levels or property type rented, 
reducing the exchequer cost of LHA.
In none of these cases would the removal of the £15 excess lead to lower rents. Hence, we 
would not expect any of the incidence of this LHA reduction to be on the landlord. Indeed, 
because the first item in the list above implies some transfer of the excess from claimants 
to landlords (rather than to the exchequer), the extent to which tenants lose from this reform 
can exceed the amount by which their LHA entitlement is reduced (i.e. more than 100 per 
cent of the LHA reduction can be incident on tenants). These are unusual and potentially 
important features of this particular rent subsidy reform. They imply that, all else being equal, 
we should expect a greater share of the incidence of the April 2011 LHA reforms to be on 
tenants than in the case of other rent subsidy reforms examined in the academic literature 
(see below). 
In the empirical analysis that follows, it is not possible to separate robustly the impacts of 
the removal of the £15 excess from the impacts of the other reforms to LHA in April 2011, 
for two reasons. First, many claimants who would have benefited from the £15 excess pre-
reform would also have been affected by the switch from the 50th to 30th percentile for LHA 
rates (the exceptions are those whose rent was already below the 30th percentile). Second, 
we are analysing new LHA claims in this report, and we do not know which post-reform 
new claimants would have chosen properties that cost less than their LHA rate (and hence 
benefited from the £15 excess) in the absence of the reform. Nevertheless, in cautiously 
offering potential interpretations of our empirical results in Section 3.4, it will be useful to be 
aware of the types of new claimants who were most likely to benefit from the excess rule. 
Table 3.2 documents this, and shows that these groups include households with children  
and claimants in London and Scotland. 
Subsequent analysis to be undertaken in this research project will examine the impact of the 
reform on existing claimants, and will attempt to disentangle the impact of this component 
of the reforms from that of other components. This will be possible both because existing 
claimants were affected by the removal of the £15 excess at a different time from the other 
reforms,36 and because we can observe the pre-reform housing choices of existing claimants 
(and how they subsequently changed). 
36 Existing claimants lost entitlement to any excess in April 2011. For the other elements 
of the LHA reductions analysed here, existing claimants were affected nine months 
after the first post-April 2011 anniversary of their claim (i.e. at some point between 
January and December 2012).
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It is crucial to note that the discussion so far has focused on what economic theory tells 
us about the incidence of the changes to rent subsidies in steady state – in other words, 
once the private rental market has adjusted to its new post-reform equilibrium. But such 
adjustment may take time. For example, nominal ‘rent stickiness’ could occur if there is 
imperfect awareness of the reforms on the part of landlords (as suggested by some of the 
evidence in Section 5), or if there are costs associated with drawing up new rental contracts 
mid-tenancy. It is perfectly possible, therefore, that the relative incidence of LHA reductions 
on landlords and tenants changes over time. In a future report we will investigate such 
changes, by tracking the new claimants analysed here over a number of months to look  
for evidence of delayed effects of the LHA reductions on rent levels.
Table 3.1 Proportions of new LHA claimants with contractual rent less than, equal  
 to and greater than their LHA rate, June to November 2010
Characteristic Rent less than LHA 
rate 
%
Rent equal to LHA 
rate 
%
Rent greater than 
LHA rate 
%
Household type
Single man 33 10 57
Single woman 32 8 60
Couples without children 25 7 68
Single parents 41 15 44
Couples with children 46 10 43
Age of claimant
Under 25 32 11 57
25–34 38 11 51
35–44 38 11 51
45–54 37 10 53
55–64 32 9 59
65 and above 30 7 62
Government Office Region
North East 31 11 59
North West 34 12 54
Yorkshire and Humberside 36 11 53
East Midlands 33 10 58
West Midlands 32 11 57
East of England 33 10 57
London 43 14 43
South East 37 10 53
South West 37 9 55
Wales 27 9 65
Scotland 42 11 47
All 36 11 53
Notes: Rent is taken to be equal to the LHA rate here if it is within £1 per week of it Rows may not 
sum to 100 per cent due to rounding.
Source: Single Housing Benefit Extract (SHBE).
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3.2.2 Previous evidence on the effects of changes to rent 
subsidies
As discussed, economic theory does not generally provide definitive guidance on the impact 
of LHA reductions: it suggests that the effects will depend upon the details of the private 
rented market. It is, therefore, instructive to consider the evidence provided by previous 
empirical studies of the impacts of rent subsidies, as well as the limitations of those studies 
for providing guidance on the likely impacts of the particular reforms considered here. 
The last substantial changes to the UK HB system before the introduction of LHA for the 
PRS in April 2008 were in the mid-1990s. Gibbons and Manning (2006) studied the impacts 
of those reforms, which reduced the maximum amounts of rent that could be covered by an 
HB claim in given properties. Using survey data on England only, the authors found that at 
least about one half of the incidence of those HB reductions was on landlords via reduced 
rents (subject to the caveat that they had only limited controls for housing quality, as here – 
see sub-section 3.4).
A small number of studies have explored changes in rent subsidies in other countries in 
order to estimate their incidence. Fack (2006) looked at reforms to rent subsidies in France 
in the early 1990s, and estimated that 78 per cent of the incidence of those changes was 
on landlords. One limitation of that study is that the reforms in question affected only small 
households, so the findings may not generalise to the French population as a whole.  
But earlier work using different French data and a different methodology also found that 
a significant portion of the incidence of rent subsidies was on landlords (Laferrere and le 
Blanc, 2002). Susin (2002) studied the impact of rent vouchers for low-income households  
in 90 metropolitan areas of the USA, and found that they have increased rent levels for those 
households substantially (by about 16 per cent).
In summary, empirical studies of the impact of rent subsidies have tended to find that the 
incidence is largely on landlords in the form of higher rents, mainly because the supply of 
rental accommodation is unresponsive to changes in rent levels. This is true both in the 
UK and elsewhere. If the incidence of rent subsidies is indeed partly on landlords, then 
reductions to rent subsidies would reduce rents. 
But of course, the direct relevance of the previous literature on the incidence of rental 
subsidies for this particular study may be limited. The structure of the rental market might 
be different in the UK now compared with the mid-1990s period studied by Gibbons and 
Manning; and one needs to be cautious in inferring too much from studies in other countries, 
which have different subsidy systems and different markets. Furthermore, as discussed, with 
all else being equal we would expect the overall incidence of the reforms studied here to be 
different from those studied elsewhere, as theory suggests that the removal of the £15 per 
week excess will be entirely incident on tenants.
3.3 Data and methodology
This sub-section describes the data and methodology used in the empirical analysis that 
follows.
The empirical analysis in sub-section 3.4, as in the spatial analysis in Section 2, uses 
administrative data from the Single Housing Benefit Extract (SHBE). This is made up of 
returns submitted to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) each month by all local 
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authorities (LAs) in England, Scotland and Wales and contains information on the status 
of each claim. The key data available to the research team and utilised in the proceeding 
analysis include information on claimants’ contractual rents, LHA rates, BRMAs, LAs, LHA 
bedroom entitlements, actual number of bedrooms, household type, and age on a particular 
day each month. 
We add DHPs to LHA entitlements when tracking what has happened to entitlements over 
time (see Section 6 for a fuller discussion of the use of DHPs in the research case study 
areas). Our estimates will, therefore, account for any effects of changes in DHP allocation 
alongside the LHA changes. For simplicity we continue to refer to entitlements simply as 
‘LHA entitlements’. Unsurprisingly, given the small monetary amounts involved relative to  
the reductions to LHA, the inclusion of DHP makes a negligible difference to our estimates.
The focus is on new claimants of LHA, rather than those who were already in receipt of  
LHA in April 2011 when the reforms took place. As described earlier, the latter group were  
not affected by all of these measures until 2012, and this group of existing claimants will 
be the subject of a future report on impact. Table 3.2 describes the composition of this flow 
of new claimants in terms of basic demographic characteristics: measures of household 
type, age, and region. This is done for June to November inclusive, separately for 2010 
and 2011 (i.e. both before and after the LHA reforms considered here were implemented). 
As explained below, we use data from those periods to formally estimate the impacts of the 
reforms in sub-section 3.4.
Table 3.2 Demographic characteristics of new LHA claimants
Characteristic Jun-10 to Nov-10 Jun-11 to Nov-11
Household type
Single man 35.7 34.5
Single woman 18.8 18.7
Couples without children 7.6 7.6
Single parents 24.3 24.5
Couples with children 13.7 14.7
Age of claimant
Under 25 23.2 22.6
25–34 32.8 33.1
35–44 22.8 22.6
45–54 13.0 13.4
55–64 5.6 5.6
65 and above 2.6 2.7
Government Office Region
North East 4.9 4.6
North West 13.8 13.5
Yorkshire and Humberside 9.1 9.7
East Midlands 7.0 7.2
Continued
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Table 3.2 Continued
Characteristic Jun-10 to Nov-10 Jun-11 to Nov-11
West Midlands 8.3 8.5
East of England 7.8 8.0
London 16.0 14.5
South East 12.4 12.5
South West 9.2 9.5
Wales 5.3 5.5
Scotland 6.3 6.6
Source: Single Housing Benefit Extract (SHBE).
Because the reforms affect all new LHA claimants from the same date, there is no natural 
control group of new LHA claimants who can be used to estimate the impacts of the reforms. 
Therefore, our strategy is effectively to compare outcomes for those who claimed LHA 
shortly after April 2011 with those who claimed LHA shortly before April 2011. 
The empirical analysis in the following sub-section includes descriptive graphical analysis  
of how the key outcomes of interest (including rents, different measures of property type, 
the amount of LHA received and the shortfall between rent and the amount of LHA received) 
changed over time. Such analysis will not necessarily give us an unbiased impression of 
the causal impact of the reform, for at least two reasons. First, any change could reflect a 
general underlying time trend independent of the April 2011 reforms. For example, rents  
tend to increase over time (although this does not appear to have been happening for 
new LHA claimants in the period before the reforms in question, as shown in sub-section 
3.4). These underlying time trends, therefore, need to be modelled if the causal effect of 
the reforms on rents is to be estimated. Second, any changes over time could be due to 
changes in the composition of LHA recipients: for example, if the number of single claimants 
(who are typically entitled to smaller properties with lower rents) increased after the reform 
for reasons that were unconnected with the changes to LHA, it would be wrong to conclude 
that the reform had caused rents to fall. 
In order to estimate the impact of the reforms formally, we use multivariate regression 
analysis. This allows us to control for the changing composition of LHA recipients, and to 
allow the outcomes (e.g. rents) to have an underlying time trend (i.e. one that exists even 
after controlling for the observed characteristics of LHA recipients) both before and after 
the reform date. We then look for a change in the outcome in the period after the reform 
beyond what would be predicted by any changes in our control variables and the underlying 
time trends. As described below, in order to avoid bias in our estimates of the reform due to 
the effects of people anticipating the reforms and changing their behaviour accordingly, we 
exclude a window of data surrounding the time of the reform (April 2011) from this analysis. 
In technical terms, our identification strategy, therefore, lies somewhere between a before-
after study and a regression discontinuity design. 
We estimate equations of the following form using Ordinary Least Squares regressions:
	 ϒit = χ′itβ	+ f(t) + Y.POSTt  + εit	,
Where ϒit	is an outcome of interest for individual i starting an LHA claim at time t, χit	contains 
some explanatory variables, f(t) is a flexible time trend, POSTt	is an indicator for whether an 
individual started their LHA claim after April 2011, and εit	is an error term which captures the 
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unobserved determinants of the outcome. The parameter of interest is, therefore Y, which 
is the effect of the reforms on the outcome of interest. In all cases our estimated standard 
errors around the estimate of Y	are robust to flexible specifications of the error term.37 
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 The pattern of new LHA claims 
The dark (top) line in Figure 3.3 shows the number of new LHA claims being made over the 
period. On average over the period from June 2010 to December 2011 there were around 
1,900 new LHA claims each week, with more new claims typically falling in the first week of 
each month and slightly fewer claims typically falling in later weeks in a month. Two other 
periods exhibit a slightly different pattern, in terms of the number of new claims. First, the 
period from Christmas to New Year has fewer new claims. Second, the spike in new claims 
close to the start of April 2011 is particularly high and the number of claims later in April 2011 
and early May 2011 is particularly low. 
The atypical pattern in the number of new claims at around the introduction of the April 
2011 LHA reforms suggests that the number and/or timing of new claims may have been 
affected by the reforms. This is consistent with the financial incentives created by their roll-
out: they affected new LHA claimants immediately, but affected existing claimants only nine 
months after the anniversary of their claim (except for the removal of the £15 excess). Those 
whose claim started prior to April 2011 were, therefore, not affected by most of the reforms 
until 2012, with the exact date depending on precisely when their claim started. Therefore, 
households who started a claim shortly before April 2011 would not have been affected by 
most of the LHA measures until up to 21 months after households who started a claim just 
after April 2011. Some households who were planning to make an HB claim at around the 
reform date would, therefore, have had much stronger financial incentives than usual to sure 
that this was done quickly, so that the claim started before 1st April 2011.38 
Other possible anticipatory responses could have included ceasing an existing claim 
shortly before the reform so that a new one could be started. The extent to which this 
was widespread would depend on the extent of awareness about the reforms before their 
37 Technically, we allow for arbitrary forms of heteroscedasticity and correlation in the 
error term across different observations within a BRMA, using a cluster-robust variance 
estimator (Liang and Zeger, 1986). Allowing for heteroscedasticity means that analysis 
is robust to the variance of the error term depending on the values of the explanatory 
variables. Clustering at the BRMA level allows for the error term to be both serially 
and cross-sectionally correlated within BRMAs. Failure to account for any intra-BRMA 
correlation would tend to result in underestimates of the true standard errors (see  
e.g. Moulton, 1990).
38 The peak in the number of new claims around the reform date actually occurs on 
1 April 2011, though the spike starts some days before that. This might seem odd, as  
1 April 2011 was the first day on which new claimants would have been affected by the 
LHA reductions. This may just reflect claimants rushing and narrowly failing to get their 
claim started before the reform date. Alternatively, there could be some measurement 
error in the data, perhaps because LAs have a tendency to record claims as starting  
at the beginning of a month even if, in fact, they started a few days either side of that.  
In any case, our estimates of the effect of the reform are insensitive to this, as we 
exclude the window of data surrounding the reform date from our regression analysis.
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implementation. Evidence presented in Section 4 and Section 5 of this analysis indicated 
generally low awareness of the reforms on the part of tenants, but, on the other hand, a good 
understanding of the reforms on the part of some landlords. (As shown in Section Five, one 
large landlord in the case study areas allocated all their LHA tenants to different properties 
within their portfolio shortly before the reforms came in.) If this were the only explanation, 
however, we would expect the abnormal patterns of claims at around the reform date to 
‘disappear’ if we exclude from consideration new LHA claims which followed other claims by 
the same claimant that had been active within the previous six months. This is not the case, 
as shown by the lower line in Figure 3.3.
As analysis later in this sub-section shows, it was claimants in higher-rent areas (in 
particular, London) who were more likely to start a new claim just before the reforms were 
introduced. This is consistent with the anticipatory responses discussed above. Such 
claimants would in general have more to lose in cash terms from the shift from the 50th to 
30th percentile for LHA rates, and would be more likely to be affected by the national caps.
In order to ensure that anticipation effects do not bias our estimates of the impact of the LHA 
reductions, we exclude all claims made in the window between 1 December 2010 and 31 
May 2011 from the regression analysis. This excluded window of data is marked with vertical 
lines on Figure 3.3 and on subsequent Figures. The drawbacks of excluding a window of 
data are loss of sample size and the fact that parametric estimates of time trends have to 
extrapolate further outside of the range of the estimation sample. But the sample size is  
very large, and the time trends in our outcomes of interest look uncomplicated (see below). 
As reported later, we have conducted sensitivity analysis which shows that our key estimates 
are robust to small shifts in the window of data excluded.
Figure 3.3 HA on-flow by day: all new claims, and excluding those following a claim  
 active within last 6 months (seven-day moving average)
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As analysis later in this sub-section shows, it was claimants in higher-rent areas (in 
particular, London) who were more likely to start a new claim just before the reforms 
were introduced.  Thi  is consistent with the anticipatory re ponses discussed above. 
S ch claimants ould in general have m re to lose in cash terms from the shift ro  
the 50th to 30th percentile for LHA rates, and would be more likely to be ffect d by 
the national caps. 
In order to ensure that anticipation effects do not bias our estimates of the impact of 
the LHA reductions, we exclude all claims made in the window between 1st 
December 2010 and 31st May 2011 from the regression analysis.  This excluded 
window of data is marked with vertical lines on Figure 3.3 and on subsequent 
Figures.  The drawbacks of excluding a window of data are loss of sample size and 
the fact that parametric estimates of time trends have to extrapolate further outside 
of the range of the estimation sample.  But the sample size is very large, and the 
time trends in our outcomes of interest look uncomplicated (see below).  As reported 
later, we have conducted sensitivity analysis which shows that our key estimates are 
robust to small shifts in the window of data excluded.
Figure 3.3: LHA on-flow by day: all new claims, and excluding those following 
a claim active within last 6 months (seven-day moving average) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
The analysis that follows examines the impact of the reforms on claimants’ rents, 
property types, maximum LHA entitlements, and shortfalls between rent paid and 
maximum LHA entitlement.  
Contractual Rents 
Figure 3.4 shows what happened to new claimants’ contractual rents around the time 
that the reform was introduced.  
Source: A ors’ ca culations using SHBE data extract.
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The analysis that follows examines the impact of the reforms on claimants’ rents, property 
types, maximum LHA entitlements, and shortfalls between rent paid and maximum LHA 
entitlement. 
3.4.2 Contractual rents
Figure 3.4 shows what happened to new claimants’ contractual rents around the time that 
the reform was introduced. 
Figure 3.4 Average weekly rents of new LHA claimants by date of claim (seven-day  
 moving average)
Source: Author’s calculations using SHBE data extract.
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extr ct.
 
The most striking feature of Figure 3.4 is the spike in rents just before the reforms were 
introduced at the start of April 2011. This can be predominantly explained by the composition 
of LHA claimants over the period. For example, in the data underlying Figure 3.4, the 
proportion of new LHA claims being made in London rose by three percentage points 
between January and March 2011, from 14.3 per cent to 17.3 per cent. The same proportion 
never fluctuated by more than one percentage point over any other two-month period in 
these data, so it seems very likely that this is related to the reforms. Similarly, the average 
number of individuals per household – which is unsurprisingly correlated with rent levels, 
presumably due mainly to property size – among new LHA claimants rose from 1.86 to 1.95 
between January and March 2011, and again this is a larger fluctuation than over any other 
two-month period in the data. As stated above, this is consistent with the fact that claimants 
with higher rents would have had larger financial incentives to start new claims just before 
April 2011, because they generally had more to lose from the reforms. 
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Figure 3.5 Average weekly rents of new LHA claimants by date of claim (seven-day  
 moving average)
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Figure 3.4: Average weekly rents of new LHA claimants by date of claim (seven-day 
moving average) 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract. 
Figure 3.5: Average weekly rents of new LHA claimants by date of claim (seven-day 
moving average) 
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Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
Figure 3.5 shows more formally that we can explain much of the spike in rents with reference 
to the changing composition of claimants in the immediate pre-reform period. It plots the 
component of rent levels that is not explained by the combination of BRMA and number of 
bedrooms.39 When we do this, the spike in rents is almost entirely eliminated, confirming that 
the spike is (at least primarily) due to particular kinds of claimants being more likely to start 
claims in the immediate pre-reform period. 
Abstracting from what appear to be the anticipation effects of the reforms, the other 
noteworthy feature of Figure 3.4 is that rents do not appear to be very different in the post-
reform period relative to the pre-reform period. This is certainly the case in the context of  
the size of the corresponding changes in LHA entitlements, as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Table 3.3 shows the results of linear regression analysis of this time series to investigate the 
changes in rents, and whether they can be explained by changes in the (limited) measures 
of property type in the SHBE data. Moving from left to right across the table, more controls 
are added: model (1) contains only a post-reform dummy variable; model (2) adds controls 
for BRMA and LA; model (3) adds controls for the number of bedrooms in the property, and 
interaction terms that capture all possible combinations of number of bedrooms and BRMA; 
model (4) adds linear time trends for each BRMA, which are allowed to differ before and after 
the reform; and model (5) adds controls for household type and age (jointly). The notes to 
the Table contain precise definitions of the control variables.
39 Technically, this is a plot of the residuals from a regression of rents on indicators for 
BRMA, the number of bedrooms, and all possible combinations of the two.
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The results show a small fall in raw rents (column 1) in the post-reform period relative to 
the pre-reform period. But this change in rents is not statistically significantly different from 
zero (indicating that the fall is not large enough to be clearly out of line with the normal 
level of volatility in rent levels). In order to estimate whether any of the incidence of the LHA 
reductions was on landlords rather than tenants, we need to control for property type – raw 
rents may change simply because tenants move to properties with different rent levels. The 
next two columns do this, adding controls for the LA and BRMA that claimants are renting 
in and the number of bedrooms in the property. As we move from model 1 to model 2 the 
estimated change in rent turns positive; and from model 2 to model 3 it becomes more 
positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the small fall in unadjusted rents in 
the post-reform period can be explained by claimants moving to cheaper areas and renting 
smaller houses in that period (note that these changes were not necessarily caused by 
the reforms, as there may have been wider time trends – we explore this in more detail 
later, examining the impact of the reforms on the limited measures of property type that are 
available in the SHBE data). 
Model 4 adds general time trends to the model, allowing them to vary by BRMA and between 
the pre-reform and post-reform periods. This can be viewed as the first reasonable estimate 
of the effects of the reform on the price of rental accommodation, as we have now controlled 
for property type and for general time trends unrelated to the reform. The estimate is that 
the reforms had a very small downwards effect on rents, but this effect is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. 
Table 3.3 Impact of the LHA reforms on contractual rents of new LHA claimants  
 (£  per week)
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-reform coefficient -1.57 0.12 1.62*** -0.21 -0.46
Standard error (1.11) (0.52) (0.43) (0.66) (0.64)
R2 0.000 0.256 0.499 0.500 0.513
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191 191 191
Number of observations 667,278 667,278 662,764 662,764 659,892
Notes: *** Statistically significant at 1 per cent level, ** Statistically significant at 5 per cent level,  
* Statistically significant at 10 per cent level. Model (1) contains only a post-reform dummy variable; 
model (2) adds controls for BRMA and LA; model (3) adds controls for the number of bedrooms in 
the property (shared accommodation, one bedroom, two bedrooms, three bedrooms, four bedrooms, 
five or more bedrooms), and interaction terms that capture all possible combinations of number of 
bedrooms and BRMA; model (4) adds linear time trends for each BRMA, which are allowed to differ 
before and after the reform; and model (5) adds joint controls for family type and age. We define  
40 mutually exclusive combinations of family type and age: families without children are split jointly 
by family type (single men, single women, couples) and age of claimant (under 25, 25-34, 35-44,  
45-54, 55-64, 65 or more); families with dependent children are split jointly by whether lone parents 
or couple parents, age of claimant (under 25, 25-34, 35-44, 45 or more), and number of children  
(one or two or more for under 25s, and one, two or three or more for other ages). Standard errors  
are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level.
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data from June 2010 to November 2010 and June 2011  
to November 2011.
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Finally, model 5 adds controls for household type and age. The argument for adding them to 
the specification is that they may be changing over time for reasons unrelated to the reform, 
therefore, changing the kinds of properties that are rented – and hence changing rent levels 
– in ways that are not adequately captured by our parametric time trends. This makes little 
difference to our estimates of the impact of the reforms on rents.
It is worth noting at this point that the SHBE data record contractual rents. We cannot be 
certain that this is always what tenants actually pay. Qualitative analysis from landlords 
(Section 5) and housing advisers (Section 6) suggests that some landlords agreed to accept 
a lower rent payment from their tenants following the reform without any formal contractual 
change – an impact that would not be picked up by examining these data. If this is an 
important phenomenon, we would expect to find different impacts on contractual rents 
when we look at the same claimants some time later, once tenancy agreements have been 
formally renewed. This will be investigated in a future report from the research team.
3.4.3 Maximum LHA entitlements
We now turn to the effects of the reform on maximum LHA entitlements. We define these 
as entitlements before means tests and non-dependent deductions, which are simple 
functions of rents and LHA rates. The reason for abstracting from the effects of means tests 
on entitlements is that it is possible that claimant’s resources from the point of view of the 
HB means test are themselves affected by the reform. For example, if a claimant moves 
into work in response to LHA reductions, this increases their income and may subsequently 
reduce their means-tested LHA entitlement. We would not want to count this as a further 
reduction to LHA due to the reforms in the same way that we would count reductions to 
pre-means test entitlements. Our approach also guards against the risk that changes in the 
relative proportions of in-work and out-of-work LHA claimants over time – unrelated to any 
effects of the reform, and perhaps related to the state of the economy – could bias estimates 
of the effects of the reform by changing the proportion of LHA claimants who are entitled 
to maximum LHA. We ignore the effects of non-dependent deductions on entitlements for 
analogous reasons, as the number of non-dependents in households may change over time.
Figure 3.6 shows the evolution of average maximum LHA entitlements for new LHA 
claimants. There is a spike in the period immediately before the April 2011 LHA reductions. 
This is unsurprising given the spike in rents over the same period discussed previously,  
due to more families with high rents making new claims, seemingly in anticipation of the 
reforms. Figure 3.6 also shows maximum LHA entitlements clearly settling at a lower level 
after the reform than they had been pre-reform. Again, this is entirely unsurprising given  
that the reforms in question were explicitly designed to reduce LHA entitlements. The fall  
in LHA entitlements is due to a combination of reductions in LHA rates, the removal of up  
to £15 per week of entitlements in excess of rents (both of which are mechanical effects of  
the LHA reforms), and any changes in rent levels. But the key information provided by the 
figure is that the fall in LHA entitlements was clearly much larger than any fall in rents in 
the post-reform period (see Figure 3.4). This is suggestive that the majority of the initial 
incidence of the LHA reductions was, therefore, on new LHA claimants rather than their 
landlords. We verify this with the formal regression analysis presented in Table 3.4.  
This shows that, after accounting for time trends and control variables in the same way  
as previously (see previous sub-section on Contractual Rents), the estimated impact of  
the reforms on average maximum LHA entitlements is negative, and both economically  
and statistically significant, at -£8.21 per week.
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Figure 3.6 Average maximum weekly LHA entitlement for new claimants by date of  
 claim (seven-day moving average) 
Source: Author’s calculations using SHBE data extract.Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
Table 3.4 Impact of the LHA reforms on maximum LHA entitlements of new LHA  
 claimants (£ per week)
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-reform coefficient -9.28*** -7.73*** -6.36*** -7.87*** -8.21***
Standard error (1.18) (0.63) (0.48) (0.52) (0.50)
R2 0.008 0.411 0.792 0.795 0.864
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191 191 191
Number of observations 667,278 667,278 662,764 662,764 659,892
Source: As for Table 3.3.
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3.4.4 Shortfall (contractual rent minus maximum LHA 
entitlement)
For completeness, Figure 3.7 and Table 3.5 show the raw data and regression results 
when using the LHA shortfall as the outcome of interest. Since this is simply the difference 
between rent and maximum LHA entitlement, the results here are directly implied by the 
results shown previously for rent and maximum LHA individually. The Figure confirms that 
LHA shortfalls were clearly higher on average after the reform than before it – implied by the 
fact that the reductions in maximum LHA entitlements were far larger than any reductions in 
contractual rents. Table 3.5 shows that this remains true after controlling for property type 
and time trends. We estimate that an economically and statistically significant amount – 
about £7.80 per week, on average – of the reduction in LHA entitlements in given properties 
(subject to our limited controls for property type) was incident on tenants.
Figure 3.7 Average shortfall between maximum LHA entitlement and contractual rent 
 for new LHA claimants (seven-day moving average)
Source: Author’s calculations using SHBE data extract.Source: Authors’ calculations sing SHBE data extract.
Table 3.5 Impact of the LHA reforms on shortfalls of new LHA claimants (£ per week)
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-reform coefficient 7.71*** 7.85*** 7.97*** 7.66*** 7.76***
Standard error (0.34) (0.35) (0.35) (0.49) (0.49)
R2 0.007 0.022 0.042 0.044 0.061
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191 191 191
Number of observations 667,278 667,278 662,764 662,764 659,892
Source: As for Table 3.3.
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Note that, in the pre-reform period, it was possible for shortfalls to be negative, because 
the excess rule meant that maximum LHA entitlement could exceed rent by up to £15 per 
week. Part of the increase in shortfalls is, therefore, caused by the removal of the ability of 
claimants to keep this surplus. A possible alternative outcome of interest, which is not directly 
affected by the removal of the £15 per week excess, is the proportion of claimants who face 
a strictly positive shortfall (i.e. who have to finance their rent at least partially from non-LHA 
resources). Figure 3.8 and Table 3.6 below, therefore, present the analogous analysis using 
a binary indicator for ‘having a shortfall greater than zero’ as the outcome of interest.40 These 
make clear that the observations above were not driven simply by the removal of the £15 
excess. We estimate that the reform increased the probability of new LHA claimants in given 
types of properties having a maximum LHA entitlement less than their rent by 11 percentage 
points. This is statistically significant. 
Figure 3.8 Proportion of new LHA claimants with a strictly positive shortfall by date  
 of claim (seven-day moving average)
Source: Author’s calculations using SHBE data extract.Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
40 As this is a binary outcome, the results presented in Table 3.5 are based upon probit 
estimation rather than Ordinary Least Squares.
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Table 3.6 Impact of the LHA reforms on probability of having a strictly positive LHA  
 shortfall for new claimants
Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-reform marginal effect 0.09*** 0.09 0.09 0.09*** 0.11**
Standard error (0.01) (0.08) (0.08) (0.01) (0.04)
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191 191 191
Number of observations 667,278 667,277 662,669 662,669 659,797
Notes and source: As for Table 3.3.
3.4.5 Summary: the incidence of LHA reductions in given 
property types
Combining the results from the final columns of Tables 3.3 to 3.5 (i.e. from the models which 
account for any underlying time trends unrelated to the reform, as well as any changes in 
the household types and ages of claimants), we can form an estimate of a key aspect of 
the impacts of the LHA reductions: the extent to which reductions in LHA entitlements in 
given types of properties (defined by LA, BRMA and number of bedrooms) were incident on 
tenants (via increased shortfalls) or their landlords (via reduced rents). We estimated that 
the reform reduced maximum LHA entitlements in given property types by an average of 
£8.21 per week, while resulting in rent reductions in given property types averaging £0.46 
per week. As shown in Table 3.7, this implies that 94 per cent of the incidence of reductions 
in LHA entitlements in given properties resulting from the reforms was on tenants, with 
the other 6 per cent on landlords. Note that, since the change in rents resulting from the 
reforms is not statistically significantly different from zero, the incidence on landlords is not 
statistically significantly different from zero either.
The results are robust to the precise time periods chosen to form our estimating sample  
(to avoid bias in our estimates arising from anticipation effects, we exclude a window of data 
around the reform date – see the beginning of this sub-section for details). If we extend the 
window of data by one month in the pre-reform period and one month in the post-reform 
period, thereby including December 2010 and May 2011, the estimate of the reduction in 
maximum LHA entitlements resulting from the reforms changes from £8.21 per week to 
£8.92 per week, and 96 per cent of that is estimated to be incident on tenants.
It is important to note that the indicators of property type captured in the SHBE data –  
LA, BRMA and number of bedrooms – may not be the only relevant ones. Even after 
controlling for these aspects of property type, new LHA claimants after the reforms could 
be in properties that would have been cheaper than the properties rented by new claimants 
before the reforms even in the absence of reforms. If true, this would imply that we are 
picking up changes in housing choices by LHA claimants as reductions in rents by landlords, 
and hence under-estimating the true incidence of the LHA reductions on tenants.
83
Monitoring the impact of changes to the Local Housing Allowance system 
of Housing Benefit: Interim report
Table 3.7 Estimated incidence of reductions to maximum LHA entitlements,  
 conditional on LA, BRMA and number of bedrooms in the property
Impact of the reform on weekly: % of incidence on:
Maximum LHA 
amount
Contractual 
rent
Shortfall Tenants Landlords
Estimated effect -£8.21*** -£0.46 +£7.76*** 94%*** 6%
Standard error (0.50) (0.64) (0.49) - -
R2 0.864 0.513 0.061 - -
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191 191 191
Sample size 659,892 659,892 659,892 659,892 659,892
Notes: The first three columns of numbers are from model 5 in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 respectively. 
The percentage of the incidence on tenants is (- change in shortfall) / (change in maximum LHA). The 
percentage of the incidence on landlords is (change in contractual rent) / (change in maximum LHA).
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
3.4.6 Property size
The previous analysis focused on the incidence of LHA reductions in given types of property 
– specifically, the extent to which they were incident on tenants (via increased shortfalls) or 
landlords (via reduced rents). But if the reform also caused changes in the types of property 
rented by LHA claimants, this would reflect another mechanism by which the reforms were 
incident on tenants. It is, therefore, important to examine what happened to property types  
in order to get a clearer idea of the overall impact of the reforms. 
Results shown above suggested that much of the raw change in contractual rents observed 
following the reform can be explained by changes in the (limited) indicators of property type 
available in the SHBE data, namely number of bedrooms, LA and BRMA. In itself, this does 
not establish that such changes were caused by the reforms. However, the spatial analysis 
presented in Section 2 of these interim research outputs provided evidence that the reforms 
had indeed caused some geographical shifts in new LHA claims, especially in terms of the 
reduction in on-flows in central London since April 2011. Here we estimate the effects of the 
reforms on the other indicator of property type available in the SHBE data – property size,  
as captured by the number of bedrooms.
Figure 3.9 shows the average number of bedrooms for new claimants according to the  
start date of their claim. As elsewhere in this section, this is the actual number of bedrooms 
(a measure of property size) rather than the number of bedrooms that claimants are  
deemed to need for the purposes of calculating LHA entitlements (which is a measure of 
household size and structure). This series is more volatile than the others examined so 
far. One possible explanation is that, as this is not a variable that needs to be accurately 
reported for households’ LHA entitlements to be assessed, LAs are less meticulous in their 
reporting of it. Nevertheless, the figure suggests two things. First, property size increased 
significantly in the period just before the April 2011 reforms. This is likely to reflect the 
increase in the household size of new claimants over this period which, as discussed,  
may be due to anticipation effects of the reform. Second, ignoring the window of data 
immediately around the reform date, there does seem to be some reduction in property  
size following the introduction of the reform, but it is unclear from the raw data whether  
this is simply the continuation of a downwards trend that began before the reform. 
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Figure 3.9 Average number of bedrooms for new LHA claimants by date of claim  
 (seven-day moving average)
Source: Author’s calculations using SHBE data extract.
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
In order to isolate the impact of the LHA reforms on property size from other factors,  
Table 3.8 shows results for linear regressions where the dependent variable is the number 
of bedrooms in the property a claimant chooses to rent. Again, additional controls are added 
when moving from left to right across the Table: model (1) does not contain any control 
variables; model (2) adds time trends, which are allowed to differ before and after the 
reform; and model (3) also controls for the age and household type of claimants. The results 
show that there was a slight fall in the number of bedrooms in the properties claimants 
chose following the reform, but that this is simply the result of the continuation of a trend 
from before the reform: adding time trends changes the estimated impact of the reform on 
the number of bedrooms from negative to positive, and the estimated effect disappears 
altogether once controls for age and household type are added.
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Table 3.8 Impact of the LHA reforms on number of bedrooms for new LHA  
 claimants
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Post-reform coefficient -0.04*** +0.03*** -0.00 
Standard error (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
R2 0.000 0.000 0.407 
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191 
Number of observations 665,954 665,954 663,076
 
Notes: *** Statistically significant at one per cent level, ** Statistically significant at five per cent level, 
* Statistically significant at ten per cent level. The dependent variable is number of bedrooms in the 
property, where shared accommodation is treated as a zero. Model (1) does not contain any control 
variables; model (2) adds time trends, which are allowed to differ before and after the reform; and 
model (3) also adds controls for the age of the claimants and their family type, as defined in notes to 
Table 3.2. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level.
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data from June 2010 to November 2010 and June 2011 to 
November 2011. 
A related way of examining changes in housing choices as a result of the reforms is to 
examine what happened to the number of people per bedroom in the households of LHA 
recipients. As Figure 3.10 and Table 3.9 show, the results closely reflect those obtained 
when looking just at the number of bedrooms. The raw data show an increase in the average 
number of people per bedroom over time, and the regression analysis suggests that this is 
due to general time trends rather than effects of the LHA reforms.
In summary, we do not find evidence as yet that the April 2011 LHA reductions have affected 
the average size of the properties rented by LHA recipients, as captured by the number 
of bedrooms; or the average size of rented properties relative to the number of people 
inhabiting them, as captured by people per bedroom. 
Of course, these very specific results do not imply that the reforms have not affected housing 
choices. It may be the case that metrics of property type not recorded in the SHBE data did 
change as a result of the reforms; and it is shown in Section 2 that the reforms appear to 
have had some impact on the geographical distribution of new LHA claimants, notably with  
a marked reduction in on-flows in central London districts. 
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Figure 3.10 Average number of people per bedroom for new LHA claimants by date of  
 claim (seven-day moving average)
Source: Author’s calculations using SHBE data extract.
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract.
Table 3.9 Impact of the LHA reforms on number of people per bedroom for new LHA 
 claimants
Model
(1) (2) (3)
Post-reform coefficient +0.04*** +0.01 0.00
Standard error (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
R2 0.001 0.001 0.356
Clusters (BRMAs) 191 191 191
Number of observations 665,954 665,954 663,076
Notes: *** Statistically significant at one per cent level, ** Statistically significant at five per cent 
level, * Statistically significant at ten per cent level. The dependent variable is the number of people 
per bedroom in the property. Shared accommodation cases are treated as having one bedroom 
for these purposes. Model (1) does not contain any control variables; model (2) adds time trends, 
which are allowed to differ before and after the reform; and model (3) also adds controls for the age 
of the claimants and their family type, as defined in notes to Table 3.2. Standard errors are robust to 
heteroscedasticity and clustering at the BRMA level.
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data from June 2010 to November 2010 and June 2011  
to November 2011.
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3.5 Sub-group analysis
This sub-section examines how the impacts of the LHA reforms studied in the previous sub-
section varied by sub-group. 
3.5.1 Variation in impact by household type and age
The impact on claimants by household type is analysed in Table 3.10 below. Unsurprisingly, 
the biggest cash losses in LHA entitlement from the reforms were among households with 
children, who are entitled to more LHA in cash terms, all else being equal. The estimated 
incidence of the LHA reductions on single people tends to be lower than for other groups, 
particularly for single men without children. We might expect this, all else being equal,  
if individuals without partners and/or children are more mobile than others. They may be 
better able to move to properties where rents fall in response to the reform, as suggested 
later, or better able to credibly threaten to move and thereby negotiate rent reductions in  
their existing property.
Single adults without dependent children were also less likely than households with 
children to benefit from the £15 excess that claimants were allowed to keep if their LHA rate 
exceeded their rent before the reforms, as their rents more often equalled or exceeded their 
LHA rates (see Table 3.2). As discussed in sub-section 3.2, the incidence of any reduction in 
LHA resulting from the abolition of the £15 excess must be on tenants; and indeed the extent 
to which tenants lose from this reform can exceed the amount by which their LHA entitlement 
is reduced (i.e. more than 100 per cent of the LHA reduction can be incident on tenants), 
because it can result in a transfer from tenants to landlords (rather than from tenants to the 
taxpayer). Hence, this may also play a role in explaining why less of the LHA reductions 
appear to have been incident on single adults without dependent children. Future work will 
determine the extent to which the incidence of the reform varies according to whether a 
household benefited from the £15 excess prior to the reform, by exploiting data on the stock 
of existing LHA claimants.
Table 3.10 Impact of the reforms by household type
Impact of the reform on weekly: Percentage of incidence on:
Maximum 
LHA amount
Contractual 
rent
Shortfall Tenants 
%
Landlords 
%
Single men -£7.19*** -£1.28** £5.91*** 82*** 18**
Single women -£7.13*** -£0.37 £6.76*** 95*** 5
Couples without children -£6.84*** £0.50 £7.35*** 107*** -7
Lone parents -£10.22*** -£0.41 £9.82*** 96*** 4
Couples with children -£9.51*** £0.89 £10.40*** 109*** -9
All -£8.21*** -£0.46 £7.76*** 94*** 6
Notes: *** Statistically significant at one per cent level, ** Statistically significant at five per cent level, 
* Statistically significant at ten per cent level. The regression specifications underlying these results 
are the same as in Table 3.7 (and the final columns of Tables 3.3 to 3.5), except that we now include 
interactions terms between the dummy variable indicating a post-reform claim and a series of dummy 
variables indicating membership of one of the mutually exclusive subgroups defined in the left-hand 
column. The first three columns of numbers are estimated coefficients on these interaction terms.
Source: Authors’ calculations using SHBE data extract. 
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Table 3.11 shows the impact of the LHA reforms according to the age of the claimant. 
Claimants under the age of 25 tended to lose less LHA entitlement in cash terms as a result 
of the reforms, as we would expect, given that those aged under 25 who are single and 
without children are entitled only to the lowest LHA rates (the shared room rate). The results 
also suggest that smaller proportions of the reductions in maximum LHA entitlements were 
incident on younger claimants than older ones. Again, this could be explained by younger 
claimants being more mobile. 
Table 3.11 Impact of the reforms by age of claimant
Impact of the reform on weekly: Percentage of incidence on:
Maximum 
LHA amount
Contractual 
rent
Shortfall Tenants 
%
Landlords 
%
Under 25 -£6.83*** -£1.00 £5.83*** 85*** 15
25–34 -£8.67*** -£0.63 £8.04*** 93*** 7
35–44 -£8.73*** -£0.13 £8.60*** 99*** 1
45–54 -£8.57*** -£0.00 £8.57*** 100*** 0
55–64 -£8.19*** -£0.15 £8.05*** 98*** 2
65+ -£7.85*** £0.84 £8.69*** 111*** -11
All -£8.21*** -£0.46 £7.76*** 94*** 6
Notes and source: As for Table 3.10.
3.5.2 Geographic variation in the impact of the reforms
Since the nature of the rental market varies by region, we might expect some variation in the 
impact of the reforms geographically. One potential reason for geographical variation in the 
impacts of the reforms is variation in the density of LHA recipients in an area relative to the 
total size of the private rental market. As discussed in sub-section 3.2, if the private rental 
market is such that landlords consider letting to both LHA and non-LHA claimants, economic 
theory would predict that the incidence on landlords would be greater in areas where the 
relative density of LHA recipients is greater. On the other hand, if the private rental market 
is segmented such that given landlords let only to LHA or non-LHA claimants, we would 
not expect this to be important: instead, the crucial factors would be those that affect the 
responsiveness to rent levels of supply and demand for rental accommodation specifically  
in the LHA sector. This may include factors such as planning rules (on the supply side) and 
the mobility of LHA claimants (on the demand side). 
Table 3.12 below reports results after splitting claimants up according to the share of private 
rented households in their LA who are LHA claimants. Due to data availability constraints,  
we are forced to do this somewhat imprecisely: although we can directly observe in the 
SHBE data the number of LHA claimants in each LA (the numerator), we have to rely 
on 2001 Census estimates of the number of private renting households in each LA (the 
denominator). Clearly there will be a tendency for the denominator to be under-estimated 
due to growth in the number of households since 2001, but what matters here is our ranking 
of LAs (by quintile group). Measurement error will be introduced to the extent that some LAs 
have experienced faster growth in the number of private rented households than others over 
the past decade. 2011 Census data will soon be available, and we will, therefore, be able to 
refine this analysis in a future report.
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Table 3.12 shows that, according to our central estimates, the incidence of the LHA 
reductions has not varied significantly according to our measure of the density of LHA 
claimants in local private rental markets. This could be taken as tentative evidence that 
the rental markets for LHA and non-LHA claimants are segmented to a substantial degree. 
But it is also possible that this measure of density is correlated with some other factor 
which affects the incidence of the reforms in the opposite direction. Importantly, the likely 
measurement error in our ranking of LAs by the share of LHA recipients in the PRS (see 
above) would also mean that any estimates of differences by LAs along this dimension are 
downwards biased. We may, therefore, be able to draw more confident conclusions on this 
point in a future report, where we will be able to refine the measure due to the availability of 
new data. 
Table 3.12 Impact of the LHA reforms by share of LHA recipients in private rented  
 sector
Impact of the reform on weekly: Percentage of incidence on:
Maximum 
LHA amount
Contractual 
rent
Shortfall Tenants 
%
Landlords 
%
1st (lowest) -£9.37*** -£0.09 £9.28*** 99*** 1
2nd -£8.17*** -£0.18 £7.99*** 98*** 2
3rd -£8.00*** -£1.05 £6.95*** 87*** 13
4th -£8.28*** -£0.25 £8.04*** 97*** 3
5th (highest) -£7.70*** -£0.45 £7.25*** 94*** 6
All -£8.21*** -£0.46 £7.76*** 94*** 6
Notes and source: As for Table 3.10.
Table 3.13 presents an analysis by Government Office Region. The reduction in maximum 
LHA rates was largest in London, where rents are highest. As some of the reforms 
particularly reduced support for those with the highest rents, this is unsurprising.41 The 
central estimates also suggest that, conditional on property type, a larger share of the 
incidence of reductions to maximum LHA entitlements has been on landlords in the West 
Midlands, Scotland and London. It should be noted, however, that the results by region 
are estimated relatively imprecisely: only in the West Midlands can the hypothesis that the 
impact on the price of rental accommodation was zero (and hence that none of the incidence 
was on landlords) be rejected at the 10% significance level.42 
41 Indeed, the national caps on LHA rates are binding only in certain areas of London.
42 The relatively high degree of uncertainty surrounding estimates of effects by region 
is not surprising. Unobserved determinants of changes in rents are very likely to be 
correlated spatially, since rents in similar areas are likely to be affected by many 
common factors. This makes it less clear that changes in average rents within regions 
are due to the impacts of the reforms rather than normal volatility in rent levels within 
regions. We account for this by allowing for clustering of error terms at the BRMA level 
when estimating standard errors (see Section 3.2).
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Table 3.13 Impact of the LHA reforms by Government Office Region
Impact of the reform on weekly: Percentage of incidence on:
Maximum 
LHA amount
Contractual 
rent
Shortfall Tenants 
%
Landlords 
%
London -£10.69*** -£2.17 £8.52*** 80*** 20
East of England -£9.44*** -£0.03 £9.41*** 100*** 0
Scotland -£9.19*** -£2.22 £6.97*** 76*** 24
South East -£8.11*** -£0.47 £7.64*** 94*** 6
North West -£7.84*** £0.06 £7.90*** 101*** -1
Wales -£7.77*** £1.82 £9.60*** 124*** -24
North East -£7.35*** -£0.50 £6.85*** 93*** 7
Yorkshire and Humber -£7.31*** £0.22 £7.54*** 103*** -3
West Midlands -£7.21*** -£1.73* £5.48*** 76*** 24*
East Midlands -£7.20*** £0.69 £7.89*** 110*** -10
South West -£6.39*** £0.78 £7.18*** 112*** -12
All -£8.21*** -£0.46 £7.76*** 94*** 6
Notes and source: As for Table 3.10.
To investigate more closely what might be driving these results, and to gain a richer 
understanding of how the incidence of the reforms has varied geographically, Table 3.14 
splits people according to area classifications of local authorities (as also used in Section 
2). Table 3.14 suggests that the price of rental accommodation fell by more (and hence 
the proportion of changes in LHA incident on landlords rather than their tenants) in urban 
areas outside of inner London. In particular, we estimate that about one-fifth of reductions 
in LHA in given property types were incident on landlords via lower rents in the ‘Cities and 
Services’ category, which includes substantial urban areas such as Manchester, Liverpool 
and Cambridge. This is statistically significant. There is also evidence of more incidence 
on landlords in the suburbs of London, although we caution that this is estimated much 
more imprecisely (for the reasons given in footnote 42 above). A possible interpretation is 
that these categories capture more mobile groups of people. For example, perhaps LHA 
claimants living in the suburbs of London do not have strong preferences about precisely 
where around London they locate, and can, therefore, credibly threaten to move in the 
absence of rent reductions.
3.5.3 Summary
There is evidence that single claimants and younger claimants were able to pass more of  
the reduction in their maximum LHA amounts on to their landlords in the form of lower rents.
There is also some evidence that more of the LHA reductions were incident on landlords 
via reduced rents in urban areas outside London and in the suburbs of London; or, by 
Government Office Region, in the West Midlands, Scotland and London. However, these 
results are estimated relatively imprecisely, limiting the extent to which firm conclusions can 
be drawn.
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Table 3.14 Impact of the LHA reforms by area type classification
Impact of the reform on weekly: Percentage of incidence on:
Maximum 
LHA amount
Contractual 
rent
Shortfall Tenants 
%
Landlords 
%
London Centre -£19.85*** £1.91 £21.76*** 110*** -10
London Cosmopolitan -£14.35*** -£0.06 £14.29*** 100*** 0
London Suburbs -£7.03*** -£3.68 £3.35* 48* 52
Cities and Services -£8.24*** -£1.61** £6.63*** 80*** 20**
Prospering UK -£7.41*** £0.56 £7.96*** 107*** -7
Large Seaside Towns -£7.79*** -£0.23 £7.56*** 97*** 3
Coastal and Countryside -£7.56*** £0.37 £7.93*** 105*** -5
Mining and Manufacturing -£7.38*** £0.33 £7.71*** 104*** -4
All -£8.21*** -£0.46 £7.76*** 94*** 6
Notes and source: As for Table 3.10.
3.6 Conclusions
One possible mechanism by which the April 2011 LHA reductions could have been incident 
on tenants is through having less of their rents covered by LHA in given types of properties. 
Based on comparisons between new claimants after the reforms and new claimants before 
the reforms who rented similar properties, and allowing for local time trends independent of 
the reforms, we have estimated that the majority (94 per cent) of the LHA reductions were 
indeed incident on tenants (via increased shortfalls) rather than landlords (via reduced 
contractual rents).
Another possible mechanism by which the reforms could have been incident on tenants 
is if it led them to rent different kinds of properties in response. We do not find evidence 
that the reforms have yet affected the sizes of the properties claimants rent (as measured 
by the number of bedrooms). It has been shown elsewhere in these interim research 
outputs (Section 2), however, that there is evidence of some effects of the reforms on the 
geographical location of new LHA claimants in the London area. It is possible that there 
are other aspects of property type, not recorded in the SHBE data used here, which also 
changed as a result of the reforms. If so, this would act to increase the incidence on tenants 
further. The next stage of reporting will explore this using indicators of housing quality at a 
local level.
There is variation in these results by sub-group. Single claimants and younger claimants 
seem to have been able to pass a greater share of the incidence of the reforms onto 
landlords via reduced rents. We have also provided evidence that the incidence on landlords 
was greater in urban areas outside London, and in the suburbs of London.
The headline results may initially appear surprising: most of the relevant academic literature 
has found that rent subsidies have a large effect on landlords by resulting in higher rents, 
which would imply that reductions to rent subsidies significantly reduce rents. What might 
the explanations be? As explained, the removal of the £15 per week excess that claimants 
could keep if their maximum LHA entitlement exceeded their rent is different to a typical 
kind of reduction to rent subsidies, as there is no reason to expect rents to fall as a result 
(and indeed they may instead rise). This, therefore, seems extremely likely to be a factor. 
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Nevertheless, the removal of the £15 excess was only one of several LHA measures 
implemented at the same time, and was expected to raise less than half as much for the 
exchequer as the switch for LHA rates from the 50th to the 30th percentile of local rents,  
for example. 
There may well be other reasons for the low incidence of the reforms on landlords estimated 
here, and there are various reasons to be cautious about the results at this stage. First, we 
have examined the impact of the reforms on rents by looking at new LHA claimants only 
right at the start of their claims and only in short periods before and after the reforms were 
implemented. It may take time for market rents to adjust in response to the reform, and it 
may take tenants time to either negotiate a lower rent or move to cheaper accommodation 
(see Section 5 and Section 6). Under either of these hypotheses, the LHA reductions would 
lead to a larger reduction in rents in the long-run than in the short-run, and, therefore, the 
data examined here may not represent the ultimate post-reform equilibrium in the rental 
market. 
Second, with the administrative data used here it is possible to examine the impact of 
the reform only on contractual rents. There is no guarantee that this is what tenants are 
actually paying in all cases. The qualitative interviews with landlords (Section 5) and housing 
advisers (Section 6) indicated that one response to the reform has been for some landlords 
to informally accept lower rents from LHA tenants without changing their contractual rents. 
If this response is widespread, our estimates may be understating the real incidence of the 
reform on landlords. Future work will use additional data from after the introduction of the 
reform to investigate its longer term impact on landlords and tenants. In particular, it will 
examine whether the rents of those new claimants studied in this report changed later, the 
impact of the reforms on later new claimants of LHA, and the impact on existing claimants, 
who started to be affected by the reforms in January 2012. This analysis will, therefore, 
provide a much fuller assessment of the long-run impact of the LHA reforms.
 
